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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
This  study  investigates  whether  deposit  insurance  affects  bank  payout  policy.  To  overcome  identification
concerns,  we  use  the  US  Emergency  Economic  Stabilization  Act  of  2008,  which  increased  the  maximum
limit  of  deposit  insurance  coverage,  leading  to significant  changes  in  the  proportion  of  insured  deposits  to
assets  of some  banks,  while  leaving  others  relatively  unaffected.  In line  with  the  view that  dividends  con-
vey  information  regarding  financial  health,  we  find  that  banks,  which  experience  a  substantial  increase  in
insured  deposits  reduce  dividends  relative  to  others  with  a smaller  increase  in  insured  deposits.  An  exten-
sive battery  of  further  tests  confirm  that  our  results  are  not  driven  by  events  (such  as  capital  injections





pricing  changes)  that  took  place  around  the  time  of  the  increase  in the maximum  limit  of  deposit  insur-
ance  coverage.  Overall,  the  results  of  our  empirical  analysis  suggest  that  banks  holding  fewer  uninsured
deposits  pay  less  dividends.
© 2020  Elsevier  B.V.  All  rights  reserved.hare repurchases
. Introduction
During the global financial crisis many banks maintained div-
dend payouts despite suffering losses, and while rivals went
ankrupt or received large taxpayer-funded bailouts to avoid col-
apse. At the same time, a number of countries augmented existing
eposit insurance schemes in order to avert runs on individual
anks and ensure financial stability. These events have renewed
ebates regarding the impact of deposit insurance on bank behav-or, and more generally the potential moral hazard arising from
overnment interventions in the banking industry.1
∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: edie@uum.edu.my (E.E. Che Johari), dc45@st-andrews.ac.uk
D.K. Chronopoulos), l.j.r.scholtens@rug.nl (B. Scholtens), als23@st-andrews.ac.uk
A.L. Sobiech), jsw7@st-andrews.ac.uk (J.O.S. Wilson).
1 Deposit insurance can distort incentives of bank managers and depositors. For
anks, deposit insurance increases incentives to extend riskier loans or make invest-
ents given that any resultant profits accrue to the bank, while any losses are
bsorbed (in part at least) by the deposit insurance fund. Moreover, for deposi-
ors, the insurance protection from the full effects of bank failure reduce incentives
o  monitor bank health (Demirgüç -Kunt and Huizinga, 2004; Pennacchi, 2006;
ttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfs.2020.100745
572-3089/© 2020 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.In this study, we  investigate the impact of an increase in the
maximum level of deposit insurance coverage on bank dividends.
A priori it is unclear whether increases in the maximum level of
deposit insurance coverage lead to an increase or decrease in bank
dividends. The direction and magnitude of any change is likely
to depend crucially upon the extent to which deposit insurance
alters the incentives for banks to signal financial strength to depos-
itors or assume increased risk. On the one hand, deposit insurance
may  cause banks to decrease dividends by lowering their need
to use dividends in order to convey positive information regard-
ing financial health to depositors (Bessler and Nohel, 1996; Kauko,
2014; Forti and Schiozer, 2015; Floyd et al., 2015), especially unin-
sured depositors who are prone to run (Huang and Ratnovski, 2011;
Egan et al., 2017).2 Evidence suggests that during the early stages
of the financial crisis banks feared that cutting dividends could
Calomiris and Jaremski, 2016; Anginer and Demirgüç -Kunt, 2019; Flannery and Bliss,
2019).
2 Prior literature suggests that outsiders may obtain useful information regarding
the financial condition of banks from the periodic issuance of financial statements
that are certified by bank managers (Hirtle, 2006) and supervisory examination and
stress tests (Berger and Davies, 1998; Flannery et al., 2017).
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esult in a run by their short-term creditors (Acharya et al., 2011).3
he increase in the maximum level of deposit insurance cover-
ge reduces the proportion of uninsured deposits to total assets,
hus reducing the probability of a run by depositors. Therefore, an
ncrease in the maximum level of deposit insurance coverage will
ecrease the dividends of banks that have a smaller proportion of
ninsured deposits to total assets. We  refer to this as the dividend
ignaling view.
On the other hand, deposit insurance may  cause banks to
ncrease dividends by exacerbating moral hazard (Keeley, 1990).
rior evidence suggests that bank managers use dividends to shift
isk from shareholders to depositors and other creditors (Kanas,
013; Srivastav et al., 2014; Acharya et al., 2017). That is, bank
anagers can transfer a larger share of earnings to shareholders by
ncreasing dividends with resultant declines in capital reserves and
ncreased risk of default. Deposit insurance may  encourage such
isk-shifting behavior, by reducing the incentives for depositors to
onitor the financial health and riskiness of their respective banks
Flannery and Bliss, 2019). According to the risk-shifting view, a
ise in the maximum level of deposit insurance coverage could
ead banks with a smaller proportion of uninsured deposits to total
ssets to increase dividends to shareholders.
We assess the validity of these aforementioned competing
iews on the impact of deposit insurance on bank dividend pol-
cy using a change in the coverage of insured deposits of US banks.
ection 136 of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA)
ncreased the limit of the deposit insurance coverage by the Federal
eposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC (Federal Deposit Insurance
orporation), 2010). Effective on October 3, 2008 the maximum
nsurance coverage for bank deposits increased from $100,000 to
250,000. The increase in insurance coverage did not affect all banks
qually. Some banks experienced a substantial increase in insured
eposits, while others experienced a moderate or no increase at all.
sing this differential change in insured deposits across banks to
vercome identification concerns, we investigate whether there is
 causal link from deposit insurance to the payout policies of banks.
s such, we make a significant contribution to a small, but impor-
ant literature on bank dividend policy (Abreu and Gulamhussen,
013; Kanas, 2013; Kauko, 2014; Floyd et al., 2015; Forti and
chiozer, 2015; Acharya et al., 2017; Lepetit et al., 2018).
The change of the maximum level of deposit insurance cover-
ge provides an ideal setting for testing the causal effect of deposit
nsurance on dividend payout policy for several reasons. First, the
ncrease in the maximum limit of deposit insurance more than dou-
les from $100,000 to $250,000. This translates into a substantial
ncrease in the total insured deposits in the US banking system
y approximately $500 billion (Lambert et al., 2017). Second, the
ncrease in deposit insurance coverage was largely unexpected.4
hird, the increase in proportion of insured deposits to total assets
as not homogenous across banks.Our dataset (which straddles the increase in deposit insurance
overage in October 2008) comprises quarterly financial accounts
n bank holding companies over the period from 2007Q1 to
3 Juelsrud and Nenov (2019) show theoretically that banks can use dividends to
ignal their available liquidity and provide short-term creditors with incentives to
ontinue financing their assets and prevent a run.
4 On 22nd September 2008, the FDIC launched an awareness campaign to reas-
ure retail depositors that all funds within the coverage limit of $100,000 are safe
FDIC 2010). A few days later, US stock markets strongly reacted to presidential
ominees’ announcement of a plan to increase the coverage limit to $250,000. On
nd October 2008, as part of the Economic Stabilization bill, the US Senate voted for
he increase in deposit insurance and on October 3, 2008, President George W.  Bush
igned the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, which temporarily raised
he basic limit on federal deposit insurance coverage from $100,000 to $250,000 per
epositor. Journal of Financial Stability 48 (2020) 100745
2010Q4. In line with prior literature (Abreu and Gulamhussen,
2013; Srivastav et al., 2014; Bonaimé et al., 2013), we conduct
our analysis at the bank holding company level given that holding
companies are a source of strength for their subsidiaries (Ashcraft,
2008) and corporate policies, including dividend policy, are deter-
mined at the parent level (Copeland, 2012; Avraham et al., 2012;
Debbaut and Ennis, 2014).5 For brevity and unless stated otherwise,
we use the term bank to refer to bank holding company (BHC) in
the remainder of the paper. We calculate for each bank, the differ-
ence in the ratio of insured deposits to assets before and after the
change in deposit insurance coverage. This allows us to construct a
treated (affected) and a control (unaffected) group of banks based
upon the relative exposure of a given bank to the change in deposit
insurance coverage enacted under the Emergency Economic Sta-
bilization Act of 2008 in the spirit of Lambert, Noth and Schüwer
(2017). In order to assess the impact of the change in the maximum
level of deposit insurance on bank dividends, we use a difference-
in-differences approach to compare the difference in the dividend
payout of affected banks before and after the policy change with
the same difference in dividend payout of their unaffected coun-
terparts.
By way  of preview, we find that banks affected by the increase
in the maximum level of deposit insurance coverage pay lower
dividends relative to their unaffected counterparts. This result is
economically significant. On average, affected banks reduce div-
idends by $11.6 million following the increase in the maximum
level of deposit insurance coverage. This corresponds to a reduc-
tion of 76 % compared to the dividends paid by the average bank
in the sample. This finding is in line with the notion that dividends
are used by banks to signal financial health to depositors. Further
we find that the capital structure of banks does have a significant
impact on the role of deposit insurance on bank dividend policy. In
particular, we find that banks with greater dependence on deposits
for financing banking operations reduce dividends more following
the increase in deposit insurance coverage.6 In addition, we find
that our results are not confounded by other events (such as capital
injections due to participation in the Trouble Asset Relief Program,
peer effects, state tax changes, deposit insurance pricing changes,
and other local time varying events) occurring around the time of
the increase in the deposit insurance coverage. We  also examine
the internal validity of our estimations (by conducting placebo tests
and using propensity score matched samples), and thus confirm the
causal interpretation of our results.
The empirical findings of our study contribute to two  strands
of literature. First, we  add to an emerging literature that exam-
ines the relationship between deposits and bank dividends. Kauko
(2014) presents a theoretical exposition that combines dividend
signaling theory and a bank run model. He shows that banks pay
dividends in order to avoid depositor runs. Supporting this the-
ory, Forti and Schiozer (2015) find that Brazilian banks with a
higher percentage of deposits owned by institutional investors pay
higher dividends. Complementing this literature, we use US data
on insured and uninsured bank deposits to distinguish between the
extent to which banks are affected by an increase in the maximum
level of deposit insurance coverage. The difference-in-differences
approach used in the empirical analysis allows us to identify the
causal impact of deposit insurance on bank dividend payout. We
5 Conducting our analysis at the bank holding company is likely to mask potential
heterogeneity in the dividend policies adopted by subsidiary banks under the same
parent bank company.
6 We also find that the increase in the maximum level of deposit insurance
coverage has no significant impact on share repurchases, an alternative means of
channeling profits to shareholders. This finding is in line with prior evidence, which
supports the view that share repurchases are used in order to disburse the transient
rather than the permanent component of cash flows.



























































Fig. 1. US BHCs Insured Deposits in 2007Q1-2010Q4.
Note: This graph shows the evolution of the insured deposits to assets ratio (%)
for  affected and unaffected US BHCs over the period 2007Q1-2010Q4. The verticalE.E. Che Johari, D.K. Chronopoulos, B. Scholtens 
nd that affected banks reduce dividends following an increase in
he proportion of insured deposits. Therefore (and consistent with
he signaling view), banks with greater deposit insurance coverage
eel less compelled to signal financial strength to depositors.
Second, our study also contributes to ongoing debates regarding
he merits of deposit insurance schemes relative to other forms of
ank regulation and supervision (Calomiris and Jaremski, 2016).
oth theoretical and empirical evidence suggests that deposit
nsurance can ameliorate the severity and frequency of bank runs
Diamond and Dybvig, 1983; Martin et al., 2018; Anginer and
emirgüç -Kunt, 2019). Despite this crucial role, deposit insurance
as been criticized widely for inducing moral hazard and contribut-
ng to excessive risk-taking and risk-shifting behavior of banks
Keeley, 1990; Duan et al., 1992; Hovakimian and Kane, 2000;
uizani and Watanabe, 2016). Prior evidence suggests that while
eposit insurance incentivizes risk-shifting, under certain condi-
ions such behavior can be mitigated. For example, introducing risk
ensitive premiums, coverage limits and co-insurance mitigates
oral hazard and reduces incentives to shift risk (Hovakimian et al.,
003). González (2005) finds that deposit insurance increases bank
harter value, and thus places a disciplining impact on increased
isk-taking or risk-shifting. Chen et al. (2018) provide evidence
hat greater transparency increases the sensitivity of uninsured
eposit flows to bank performance, thus enhancing the disciplining
ffect on bank risk-taking behavior. Our study lends support to the
iew that deposit insurance does not lead to risk-shifting behav-
or. Rather we  find that banks reduce dividends, when the need for
ignaling lessens following an increase in deposit insurance cover-
ge. Overall, the results of this study suggest that banks with more
nsured deposits pay fewer dividends as the need to signal financial
trength to uninsured depositors is reduced.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we
escribe the empirical methodology. We  present the data and sum-
ary statistics in Section 3. In Section 4, we present the results of
ur empirical analysis. Sensitivity checks are described in Section
. Section 6 looks at share repurchases as an alternative payout
ethod. Section 7 concludes.
. Empirical methodology
.1. Background
The financial crisis started in mid-2007 when problems with
ubprime mortgages caused major losses at US banks. This raised
oncerns about the solvency and liquidity of many financial institu-
ions. With the failure of Lehman Brothers and Washington Mutual
n September 2008, the crisis intensified into a full-blown banking
anic. The US government first engaged in ad-hoc interventions to
ave a number of failing institutions, but was forced eventually to
ake a more coordinated approach. With the specific goal of stabi-
izing the US financial system and preventing a systemic collapse,
S congress initiated the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act
EESA). The EESA included the introduction of the Capital Purchase
rogram (CPP), as part of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP),
hich allowed the Department of Treasury to infuse capital into
ualifying financial institutions.
Another (less publicized) element of the EESA was  the intro-
uction of a temporary change to deposit insurance arrangements
or federally insured banks. Section 136 of the Act provided for a
emporary increase in the maximum limit of deposit insurance cov-
rage provided by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation), 2010). From enactment
n October 3rd, 2008 until the end of 2009, the maximum insured
mount per depositor increased from $100,000 to $250,000. On
ay  20th, 2009, this measure was extended for a four-year perioddashed line marks the introduction of the increased deposit insurance coverage in
2008Q4.
(until December 31st, 2013) under the terms of Section 204 of
the Helping Families Save Their Homes Act. With the passage of
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
in July 2010, the temporary increase in the maximum level of
deposit insurance coverage became a permanent feature of the
FDIC’s deposit insurance regulation.
The increase in the maximum level of deposit insurance cov-
erage in October 2008 had a differential impact across banks.
Differences in banks’ exposure to deposits that became subject to
full insurance coverage meant that some banks were affected more
by the new legislation.
2.2. Research design
To estimate the impact of deposit insurance on bank dividends,
we rely on the increase in the coverage of insured deposits in the
US banking system. The passage of the EESA Act in October 2008
provides a source of exogenous change in the extent to which bank
deposits are insured. We  use the variation in the quantity of insured
deposits across banks to identify affected (treated) and unaffected
(control) banks. Following prior literature, we classify banks into
treatment and control groups, based on the ratio of insured deposits
to total assets, as follows (Lambert et al., 2017).
In order to create the ratio of insured deposits to total assets at
the bank holding company level, we  aggregate the insured deposits
of all subsidiary banks. We  do the same for total assets. Subse-
quently, we calculate the difference in the ratio of insured deposits
to total assets before (based on the initial $100,000 limit) and after
(based on the new limit of $250,000) the increase in deposit insur-
ance coverage. The bank holding companies are then assigned to
four quartiles based on the increase in the insured deposit to total
assets ratio. We  retain only the top and bottom quartiles respec-
tively in order to form our treated and control groups of banks.
Fig. 1 illustrates the insured deposit to total assets ratio for our
treated and control groups around the event quarter. Following the
increase in deposit insurance coverage, the average increase in the
ratio of insured deposits to total assets is 20 percentage points for
the treated group of banks and five percentage points for the control
group of banks.To estimate the effect of deposit insurance on bank dividends,
we use a difference-in-differences approach. This approach com-
pares the difference in dividend payouts between the treated and




Panel A: Variables used in main analysis
DPE Total cash dividends paid to common shareholders divided by total equity capital
Affected A binary variable that equals one if banks are affected by the increase in deposit insurance coverage and zero
otherwise
Post  Event A binary variable that equals one for quarters after 2008Q4 as the event quarter of deposit insurance coverage
increase and zero otherwise
Size Size of banks as measured by the natural logarithm of total assets
Profitability Bank profitability as measured by return on assets (net income divided total assets)
Liquidity Bank liquidity as measured by total cash balance divided by total assets
Capital Bank capital as measured by total equity capital divided by total assets
Risk Bank loan portfolio risk as measured by non-performing loans divided by total loans
Charter Value Bank charter value measured by the (demeaned) ratio of demand deposits to total assets
Deposit Dependence Bank deposit dependence measured by the (demeaned) ratio of deposits divided by the sum of equity and
non-deposit debt
TARP Binary variable equal to one if a bank received government funding and zero otherwise
Panel B: Variables used in sensitivity analyses
Tax State level statutory corporate income tax rate
Peer  Peer effect is defined as the average dividend to equity of all banks in state s except bank i in quarter t
High  Assessment A binary variable that equals one if the growth rate of a bank’s insurance costs is above the sample median
value and zero otherwise










































data on insured deposits aggregated at the BHC level, with financial
data drawn from S&P Global results in 973 unique BHCs. Assigning
banks to treatment and control groups as described in Section 2Dividends The natural logarithm of one plu
RPE  Share repurchases divided by to
purchases and net conversions a
ontrol banks in the pre- and post-event periods. We  estimate
egressions of the form:
Yi,t = ˇ1 (Affectedi*Post Eventt) + ıXi,t−1 + i + t + εi,t (1)
here i indexes bank and t indexes time. Yi,t denotes the dividends
o total equity ratio (in line with prior literature on bank payout
olicy, Kanas, 2013; Onali, 2014; Onali et al., 2016). Affectedi is a
ummy  variable equal to one that captures whether a bank was
ffected by the increase in deposit insurance coverage in 2008Q4,
nd zero otherwise. Post Eventt is a dummy  variable for the post-
reatment period. This variable takes the value of one for quarters
fter 2008Q4, and zero otherwise. Affectedi ∗ Post Eventt is an inter-
ction term which takes the value of one if the bank was affected by
he increase in deposit insurance coverage in the post-event period,
nd zero otherwise. ˇ1 is the coefficient of interest, which repre-
ents the impact of the increase in deposit insurance coverage on
ank dividends. A negative (positive) value of ˇ1 would indicate
hat affected banks decrease (increase) dividends, in line with the
ignaling (risk-shifting) view.
Xi,t−1 represents a vector of bank-level control variables that
ary across banks and over time. These control variables include
ank size, profitability, liquidity, capital and risk. Prior evidence
uggests that larger and more profitable banks distribute more
ash to shareholders (Fama and French, 2001; Denis and Osobov,
008; Abreu and Gulamhussen, 2013). Liquidity could also influ-
nce dividend policy, but the precise direction of this relationship
s ambiguous (DeAngelo et al., 2006). An increase in cash hold-
ngs could reflect a lack of growth opportunities, in which case
hese cash holdings would be distributed to shareholders (Jensen,
986). However, large cash holdings could indicate a build-up of
unds to meet future uncertain demands for liquidity (Jensen and
eckling, 1976; Myers, 1977; Myers and Majluf, 1984), in which
ase there would be a negative relationship with dividends. The
xpected sign on capital is also ambiguous, given that well cap-
talized banks are less constrained in making dividends, but are
lso under less pressure to signal (to external stakeholders) their
bility to generate future cash flows. Finally, risk (measured by a
on-performing loans ratio) could have a negative influence on div-
dends if banks faced with higher non-performing loans increase
heir retained earnings to build up capital buffers. Table 1 providesollar amount of dividends paid by a bank in a quarter
ity capital. Share repurchases are defined as the sum of treasury stock
irement of common stock
a full list of variables included in the model along with their respec-
tive definitions. The model also includes time fixed effects, t , to
capture time effects common to all banks, as well as, bank fixed
effects, i , to control for unobserved bank heterogeneity. εi,t is a
stochastic error term.
Our dependent variable (dividends to total equity ratio) does not
assume negative values. This renders estimates obtained from stan-
dard ordinary least squares (OLS) inconsistent (Wooldridge, 2002).
We estimate Eq. (1) using a censored normal regression Tobit model
with fixed effects instead (Honoré, 1992). This estimator takes into
consideration the nature of our dependent variable and is con-
sistent and asymptotically normal in the presence of bank fixed
effects.7
A key assumption underlying our research design is that in
the absence of a treatment, the difference-in-differences estima-
tor would equal zero (commonly referred to as the parallel trend
assumption). In other words, this assumption requires that the
trend in the outcome variable is similar for both treated and control
groups in the period prior to the increase in the maximum amount
of insured deposits. In our empirical analysis below, we perform
a variety of checks to ensure that the parallel trend assumption is
satisfied.
3. Data and summary statistics
We  collect the financial data of US bank holding companies
(BHCs) from the S&P Global Market Intelligence database. Our sam-
ple period spans 16 quarters from 2007Q1 to 2010Q4. This period
straddles the increase in deposit insurance coverage that took place
in 2008. Given that insured deposits are not available at the BHC
level, we  rely on FDIC reports produced by commercial banks,
owned by our sample BHCs. We  then aggregate the insured deposits
of each commercial bank to their respective parent BHC. Merging7 Developed by Honoré (1992), this estimator has also been used in a recent study
in  payout policy (Arena and Kutner, 2015).
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Table  2
Summary Statistics.
All BHCs Affected BHCs Unaffected BHCs
N Mean Median Std N Mean Median Std N Mean Median Std
Panel A: Variables used in main analysis
DPE 6323 0.0077 0.0023 0.0137 3070 0.0075 0.0000 0.0143 3253 0.0078 0.0035 0.0132
Size  6321 14.1650 13.7628 1.3573 3069 13.8075 13.6660 0.7968 3252 14.5023 13.9716 1.6577
Profitability 6303 0.0005 0.0016 0.0066 3057 −0.0001 0.0016 0.0077 3246 0.0010 0.0016 0.0054
Liquidity 6321 0.0461 0.0300 0.0472 3069 0.0481 0.0325 0.0424 3252 0.0443 0.0281 0.0512
Capital 6321 0.0876 0.0828 0.0445 3069 0.0840 0.0827 0.0300 3252 0.0910 0.0829 0.0546
Risk  6316 2.7202 1.3800 3.6972 3069 3.2485 1.7300 4.1889 3247 2.2209 1.1900 3.0815
Charter Value 6323 0.0000 −0.0164 0.0626 3070 0.0039 −0.0122 0.0590 3253 −0.0030 −0.0187 0.0652
Deposit Dependence 6323 0.0000 −0.4022 2.8592 3070 0.7164 0.1718 3.3615 3253 −0.6761 −0.9929 2.0704
TARP  6323 0.3454 0.0000 0.3454 3070 0.3013 0.0000 0.4588 3253 0.3870 0.0000 0.4871
Panel  B: Variables used in sensitivity analyses
Tax 6312 0.0622 0.0650 0.0292 3059 0.0544 0.0600 0.0308 3253 0.0696 0.0710 0.0254
Peer  6323 0.0083 0.0075 0.0062 3070 0.0083 0.0074 0.0070 3253 0.0083 0.0076 0.0054
High  Assessment 6323 0.4373 0.0000 0.4961 3070 0.3798 0.0000 0.4854 3253 0.4915 0.0000 0.5000
Trans  Account 5138 0.0319 0.0000 0.0939 2485 0.0227 0.0000 0.0497 2653 0.0406 0.0000 0.1208
Dividends 6323 4.0771 5.5909 3.8147 3070 3.4069 0.6931 3.5211 3253 4.7096 6.0661 3.9704
RPE  6323 0.0029 0.0000 0.0137 3070 0.0022 0.0000 0.0137 3253 0.0035 0.0000 0.0137
No.  of banks 425 212 213
Note: This table reports summary statistics for the variables in our analysis. It tabulates the number of observations (N), means, medians, and standard deviations (Std) for
all  banks, affected banks, and unaffected banks separately. The sample is comprised of 425 US bank holding companies over the period from 2007Q1 to 2010Q4. Deposit
Dependence is demeaned to ease the interpretation of the analysis. Variable definitions can be found in Table 1.
Table  3
Test of Parallel Trend Assumption.
Variables Mean growth of control group Mean growth of treatment group Difference p-value
Dividend-to-equity growth −0.0006 −0.0009 0.0003 0.6667





























Fig. 2. US BHCs Dividends in 2007Q1-2010Q4.
banks declines by 58 basis points. This decline is also economically
9
ote: This table presents the result of a test of the parallel trend assumption by com
roups  during the pre-treatment period.
esults in a final sample of 425 unique BHCs (212 treated and 213
ontrol banks) with 6,323 BHC-quarter observations.
Of our sample of 425 banks, 360 (85 %) paid dividends at least
nce during the sample period. In terms of observations, 43 % of
ividend observations are zero.8 Table 2 provides the summary
tatistics on the number of observations, means, medians, and stan-
ard deviations for the full sample as well as for affected and
naffected banks. The average dividend to equity ratio for the
ull sample is 0.77 %. Affected and unaffected banks are similar
n terms of this measure. Specifically, the mean value of divi-
end to equity ratio for affected banks and unaffected banks is
.75 % and 0.78 % respectively. Unaffected banks are on aver-
ge slightly larger and better capitalized, more profitable, but
ess liquid (hold less cash) than affected counterparts. In Section
, using a propensity score matched sample, we  provide evi-
ence that our findings are not driven by these differences in the
haracteristics of banks
Table 3 reports the results from an initial investigation of the
arallel trend assumption. (Further test results are reported in
ection 5). The results indicate that the parallel trend assump-
ion is satisfied with growth in dividends during pre-treatment
eriod being statistically identical across treated and control
roups. Fig. 2 provides a graphical illustration of this finding.
n the years prior to 2008Q4 (pre-treatment period), the divi-
end to equity ratios of affected and unaffected banks evolve
long overlapping (parallel) paths. From 2008Q4, we  observe
iverging trends for the two groups as the dividend to equity
atio of affected banks declines by more than that of unaffected
anks.8 This justifies the use of Tobit estimator (censored regression) for our analysis.Note: This graph shows the evolution of the dividend to equity ratio for affected and
unaffected US BHCs over the period 2007Q1-2010Q4. The vertical dashed line marks
the introduction of the increased deposit insurance coverage in 2008Q4.
4. Results
Table 4 presents the main regression results. The coefficient
of the difference-in-differences (DID) interaction term, ˇ1 (in col-
umn  1) is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. The
point estimate suggests that the dividend to equity ratio for affectedsignificant; affected banks reduce dividends by $11.6 million. This
is a large reduction relative to the $15.4 million dividend paid by
9 Economic significance is calculated by multiplying the coefficient of interaction
term by the amount of equity of an average bank in our sample.
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Table 4
Deposit Insurance and Bank Payout Policy - Main Results.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Affected x Post Event −0.0058*** −0.0057*** −0.0056*** −0.0065***
(0.0019) (0.0022) (0.0020) (0.0021)
Affected x Post Event x Charter Value −0.0003
(0.0169)
Affected x Post Event x Deposit Dependence −0.0019*
(0.0011)
Affected x Post Event x TARP 0.0031
(0.0025)
Size  0.0117** 0.0110** 0.0116** 0.0107*
(0.0058) (0.0056) (0.0057) (0.0057)
Profitability 0.8577*** 0.8486*** 0.8446*** 0.8600***
(0.3107) (0.3109) (0.3053) (0.3112)
Liquidity −0.0204 −0.0196 −0.0245 −0.0215
(0.0137) (0.0143) (0.0158) (0.0138)
Capital 0.2472*** 0.2555*** 0.2744*** 0.2395***
(0.0778) (0.0779) (0.0856) (0.0779)
Risk  −0.0031*** −0.0031*** −0.0032*** −0.0031***





Bank  fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6298 6298 6298 6298
No.  of banks 425 425 425 425
Note: This table reports the results of Tobit (censored) regressions using a sample of 425 US BHCs in 2007Q1-2010Q4. The dependent variable is the dividend to equity ratio.
Column 1 investigates the effect of the increase in the deposit insurance coverage on bank dividend policy. The variable of interest is Affected x Post Event, which indicates
the  difference of payout changes between affected and unaffected banks following the increase in deposit insurance coverage. Column 2 investigates the moderating effect
of  charter value on the impact of deposits insurance on bank dividend policy. Charter Value is defined as the demeaned ratio of demand deposits to total assets. Column 3
investigates the moderating effect of capital structure on the impact of deposit insurance on bank dividend policy. Deposit Dependence is the demeaned ratio of total deposits
to  the sum of equity and total debt issued by each bank. Column 4 investigates heterogeneity in the reaction of affected banks following the increase in deposit insurance































n  Table 1. Quarter fixed effects are also included in all models. The models are es
nobserved time-invariant characteristics among banks in our sample. Standard er
 level, respectively.
he average bank in the sample. We  further investigate whether
anks, faced with an increase in deposit insurance coverage change
heir dividend policies based on their respective charter values.
hat is, banks with lower charter values may  be more inclined
o exploit the increase in the public subsidy (in the form of the
eposit insurance) than counterparts with a higher charter value
Keeley, 1990; Acharya et al., 2017). To this end (and following
rior literature) we use Charter Value, which is defined as the ratio
f demand deposits to total assets, to proxy for bank charter value
Hutchison and Pennacchi, 1996; Goyal, 2005; Onali, 2014). Specif-
cally, we introduce Charter Value and its interaction with Affected
 Post Event in Eq. (1) and re-estimate the model.10 The results are
resented in column 2 of Table 4. The triple interaction term does
ot enter the regression with a statistically significant coefficient.
his suggests that charter value does not play a significant role in
etermining how bank dividends respond to a change in deposit
nsurance coverage.
The results of our empirical analysis thus far indicate that banks
educe dividends in response to higher deposit insurance cover-
ge. While bank managers may  use dividends as a device to signal
nancial health to uninsured depositors (Kauko, 2014; Forti and
chiozer, 2015; Floyd et al., 2015), that same signal is also received
y other stakeholders. Shareholders may  react negatively to reduc-
ions in dividend payouts, given the negative implications for their
ealth. Debtholders, on the other hand, are likely to view dividend
eductions more favorably as these conserve cash during periods of
nancial difficulty and avoid risk-shifting. Prior empirical evidence
10 We demean Charter Value to ease the interpretation of the triple interaction
erm.ed using Honoré’s (1992) fixed-effect Tobit estimator, which allows to control for
re reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1 %, 5 %, and 10
however suggests that debtholders’ reaction to dividend reductions
is negative (Woolridge, 1983; Handjinicolaou and Kalay, 1984),
with adverse effects on the cost of debt (Mathur et al., 2013), which
could result in a run by creditors (Acharya et al., 2011; Juelsrud and
Nenov, 2019). Therefore, managers faced with an increased deposit
insurance coverage may  be inclined to moderate the amount of
any dividend reduction based on their dependence on equity and
non-deposit debt (relative to deposits) for financing operations.
To investigate this possibility, we  construct Deposit Dependence
equal to the ratio of deposits to the sum of equity and non-deposit
debt. Subsequently, we re-estimate Eq. (1) with Deposit Dependence,
and its interaction with Affected x Post Event. Deposit Dependence
is demeaned such that the Affected x Post Event dummy shows the
impact for the average bank, while the coefficient on the interaction
term with Deposit Dependence indicates the impact of a change in
the bank’s dependence on deposits. The results are presented in
column 3 of Table 4. The coefficient on the triple interaction term
enters with a negative sign, and is statistically significant at the 10
% level. That is, affected banks that are more dependent on deposits
relative to equity and non-deposit debt funding reduce dividends
more than their less dependent counterparts. This suggests that
the capital structure of the bank influences its decision to reduce
dividends in response to the increase in deposit insurance coverage.
During our sample period, a number of banks received capi-
tal infusions via the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). These
capital infusions could influence banks’ dividend policies by alter-
ing the risk-taking incentives of bank shareholders (Black and
Hazelwood, 2013; Duchin and Sosyura, 2014). Therefore, we  inves-
tigate whether TARP participation created heterogeneity in the way
banks faced with an increase in deposit insurance coverage change
their dividend policy. We  re-estimate Eq. (1) augmented with an























































possibility, we estimate an augmented version of Eq. (1) where we
add state-quarter fixed effects. In doing so, any confounding fac-
tor that varies by state and quarter is absorbed in the state-quarter
fixed effects, and cannot explain any of our regression findings. TheE.E. Che Johari, D.K. Chronopoulos, B. Scholtens 
nteraction term comprising TARP (a dummy  variable that is equal
o one if a bank received TARP funding and zero otherwise) and
ffected x Post Event. The results are presented in column 4 of
able 4. The coefficient on the triple interaction term enters with
 positive sign, but it is statistically insignificant at the usual lev-
ls of significance. This suggests that TARP participating banks do
ot change their dividend policies in a way that is different from
on-participating banks when faced with an increase in deposit
nsurance.11
Turning to our control variables we focus our discussion on the
aseline specification (column 1), although the results are robust
cross all specifications reported in Table 4. Specifically the coef-
cients on both Size and Profitability are positive and statistically
ignificant at the 5% and 1% level, respectively, suggesting that
arger and more profitable banks pay higher dividends (Fama and
rench, 2001; Denis and Osobov, 2008; Forti and Schiozer, 2008).
iquidity enters the regression with a negative but statistically
nsignificant coefficient. We  also find that better capitalized banks
ay higher dividends as indicated by the positive and statistically
ignificant coefficient on Capital.  This is in line with the notion
hat poorly capitalized banks face greater regulatory constraints in
istributing cash flows to shareholders (Abreu and Gulamhussen,
013; Onali, 2014). Finally, in line with prior literature, the negative
oefficient on Risk suggests that banks facing higher loan portfolio
isk pay lower dividends in an effort to build up capital (Forti and
chiozer, 2015).
Overall, our results suggest that banks with more insured
eposits pay fewer dividends as the need to signal financial strength
o uninsured depositors is reduced. Our findings largely support
hose of Floyd, Li and Skinner (2015) who contend that unlike
ndustrial firms, banks distribute cash to shareholders in order to
ignal their financial strength. They are also in line with recent theo-
etical and empirical evidence which suggests that dividends signal
ank quality during a time of uncertainty (Acharya et al., 2017;
uelsrud and Nenov, 2019).
. Robustness checks
This section discusses possible confounding effects and presents
 number of robustness checks that support the causal interpreta-
ion of the findings obtained from our analysis above.
.1. TARP capital injections
The validity of our approach would be undermined if factors
ther than the increase in the deposit insurance coverage are
riving our estimated results. Therefore, we isolate any contem-
oraneous activities that could have the potential to confound our
nalysis. As already mentioned, during the same quarter of the
ncrease in deposit insurance coverage, there were capital infusions
o troubled banks via the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). As a
esult, TARP participating banks faced restrictions on dividend pay-
uts (Bayazitova and Shivdasani, 2011; Calomiris and Khan, 2015).
pecifically, banks that received TARP funding were not allowed
o increase dividends above pre-TARP levels. Therefore, the TARP
rogram could have an effect on bank payout policy similar to that
ttributed to the increase in deposit insurance coverage.
In order to check the robustness of our findings to the TARP
ffect, we limit our sample to banks that did not participate in the
ARP. This restriction results in a reduction in our sample from
25 to 282 non-TARP banks (151 treated and 131 control). We
hen re-estimate Eq. (1). The results of this analysis are presented
11 As part of our robustness tests, we further control for confounding effects from
ARP by excluding TARP banks from our sample (see Section 5).Journal of Financial Stability 48 (2020) 100745 7
in column 1 of Table 5. The coefficient on the interaction term of
interest remains negative and statistically significant. This suggests
that our main findings are not driven by the capital infusions and
restrictions on payout policy following the introduction of TARP.
5.2. State corporate income tax
Another source of shock that could confound the results of our
analysis are changes in the state corporate income tax facing banks
in our sample. Tax rate changes have been shown to influence bank
dividend policies. For instance, Hemmelgarn and Teichmann (2014)
find that in response to tax rate changes, banks adjust capital struc-
ture via an adjustment to dividend payments.12 If tax rates in states
where treated banks are located were decreased around the same
time as the increase in deposit insurance coverage, then this could
mimic  the observed impact of deposit insurance on dividends. In
order to check the robustness of our findings to changes in state
taxation we re-estimate Eq. (1), augmented with Tax, the statu-
tory corporate income tax rate in each state, and its interaction
term with Affected.13 The results of this analysis, which are pre-
sented in column 2 of Table 5, indicate that both new variables enter
the regression with statistically insignificant coefficients, while the
coefficient on the interaction term of interest (Affected x Post Event)
remains negative and statistically significant. This finding indicates
that state taxation does not explain our main results.
5.3. Peer effects
We also investigate peer effects as a potential confounder to
our findings. Prior studies provide evidence that peer effects are
important for a number of corporate policies, including: corpo-
rate governance (John and Kadyrzhanova, 2008); fixed capital
investment and research and development (Patnam, 2011); cap-
ital structure (Leary and Roberts, 2014); and dividends (Adhikari
and Agrawal, 2018; Grennan, 2019). Therefore, we explore whether
our findings are driven by peer-influenced dividend changes rather
than signaling reasons. In order to check the robustness of our find-
ings to bank peer effects, we  re-estimate Eq. (1) by incorporating a
measure of peer influence based on the location of bank headquar-
ters. That is, we define peer banks as those banks that operate in
the same state. Following prior literature, we define peer influence,
Peer−i,s,t , as the average dividend to equity of all banks in state s
except bank i in quarter t (John and Kadyrzhanova, 2008; Adhikari
and Agrawal, 2018; Grennan, 2019). The results, which are tabu-
lated in column 3 of Table 5, indicate that Peer−i,s,t is statistically
insignificant, while the interaction term of interest (Affected x Post
Event) retains its sign and significance. These results suggest that
peer effects do not drive our main findings.
5.4. Local events
We also explore the possibility that the observed reduction in
dividends arises from unexpected events at the local level and not
from the increase in deposit insurance coverage. To rule out this12 To raise equity capital in response to a reduction in the corporate tax burden,
banks can rely on a number of instruments. A reduction in the distribution of div-
idends represents a less costly alternative to raising capital relative to issuing new
capital.
13 State level statutory corporate income tax rates are collected from various pub-
lications of the US Master Multistate Corporate Tax Guide.
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Table 5
Confounding Events.
Non-TARP Banks State Corporate Income Tax Peer Effects Local Events Insurance Premiums TAG Costs
(1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Affected x Post Event −0.0102*** −0.0057*** −0.0058*** −0.0064*** −0.0070*** −0.0069***
(0.0028) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0022) (0.0023) (0.0025)
Tax  0.0365
(0.0975)








Affected x Post Event x Trans Accounts 0.0102
(0.0131)
Bank level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank  fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State  x Quarter fixed effects No No No Yes No No
Observations 4122 6287 6298 6298 6298 5120
No.  of banks 282 424 425 425 425 342
Note: This table presents results of the effect of the increase in the limit of deposit insurance coverage on bank dividends, while considering potential confounding events.
The  dependent variable is the dividend to equity ratio. The main variable of interest is Affected x Post Event, an indicator variable equal to one for banks affected by the
increase  in the limit of deposit insurance coverage when it comes into effect, and zero otherwise. The set of control variables include Size, Profitability, Liquidity, Capital, and
Risk.  To rule out the role of TARP capital injections received by banks in our sample column 1 presents estimates from a restricted sample excluding TARP recipient banks.
Column 2 includes Tax, which captures the state statutory corporate income tax, and its interaction term with the dummy for treated banks, Affected, to alleviate concerns
that  tax changes across states drive our results. Column 3 includes the variable Peer to consider the peer effects on banks dividend policy. Peer is defined as the average
dividend to equity of all banks in state s except bank i in quarter t. Column 4 estimates Eq. (1) saturated with state by quarter fixed effects to capture unobserved state specific
time  varying unobserved characteristics. Columns 5 and 6, respectively, include High Assessment and Trans Accounts and their interaction terms with Affected x Post Event
to  capture any increases in insurance costs after the increase in deposit insurance coverage level. High Assessment is a dummy variable equal to one if the growth rate of a































omestic deposits. Quarter fixed effects are also included in all models. All specific
ime-invariant characteristics among banks in our sample. Standard errors are rep
espectively.
esults of this analysis, presented in column 4 of Table 5, indicate
hat the interaction term of interest (Affected x Post Event) remains
egative and retains its magnitude and significance. These results
uggest that events at the local level (state-quarter varying unob-
erved variables) are not driving our findings.
.5. Deposit insurance pricing
Next, we investigate whether changes in the pricing of deposit
nsurance could be driving our results. Although Section 136 of the
ESA exempts the temporary increase in deposit insurance cov-
rage from banks’ insurance assessments, other FDIC initiatives
ncluding changes in the assessment rates and the Transaction
ccount Guarantee program (TAG) are likely to have increased the
ost of deposit insurance.14 If insurance related costs are changed
ubstantially for the affected banks after the increase in deposit
nsurance coverage, this could reduce bank profitability and result
n a (mechanical reduction) in dividends. To address such concerns,
deally we would like to be able to control for the growth rate
f the assessments paid by banks in our baseline regression for
he entire period under investigation. However, as such data have
ecome confidential in nature since 2009Q2, we instead calculate
he growth rate in banks’ insurance costs from 2008Q3 to 2009Q1
i.e. for the quarters surrounding the increase in deposit insurance
overage that took place in 2008Q4). Subsequently, we construct
igh Assessment,  a dummy  variable equal to one if the growth rate
14 The TAG provided a temporary guarantee for funds held in non-interest bearing
ransaction accounts above the $250,000 coverage limit. The program was estab-
ished by the FDIC on October 14, 2008, and came into effect on December 19, 2008.
he  program set the premium at 10 basis points for all participating banks. The TAG
rogram established by the FDIC expired on December 31, 2010.s are estimated using Honoré’s (1992) fixed-effect Tobit to control for unobserved
 in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % level,
of a bank’s insurance costs is above the sample’s median value,
and zero otherwise. We  re-estimate Eq. (1) augmented with the
interaction term High Assessment x Affected x Post Event. The sep-
arate inclusion of High Assessment in Eq. (1) is not possible as the
variable is spanned by the bank fixed effects. A negative and statis-
tically significant coefficient on the triple interaction term would
imply a mechanical reduction in dividends as a result of increased
insurance costs. The results of this analysis, which are presented
in column 5 of Table 5, suggest that this is not the case and thus
confirm our main findings.
Further, we control for the costs banks face when insuring the
full amount of non-interest bearing transaction accounts in excess
of the $250,000 deposit insurance coverage in Eq. (1). Banks partic-
ipating in the TAG program faced a 10 basis point annual surcharge
applied to non-interest bearing transaction deposit amounts over
$250,000. In particular, we  augment Eq. (1) with Trans Accounts,
defined as the ratio of non-interest bearing amounts over $250,000
to total domestic deposits, and its interaction term with Affected x
Post Event, and re-estimate it. The results of this specification are
presented in column 6 of Table 5. We  find that the coefficient on
the triple interaction term is statistically insignificant, while the
interaction term Affected x Post Event enters the regression with a
negative and statistically significant coefficient. These results con-
firm our main findings.
5.6. Falsification tests and sensitivity checks
The validity of the difference-in-differences estimation requires
that in the absence of treatment, the payout policy of banks belong-
ing to the treated group would have evolved in a similar fashion
to the behavior of the banks assigned to the control group. This
so-called parallel trends assumption is key to the validity of our

























































also supported by empirical evidence suggesting that share repur-
chases are more flexible than dividends (Guay and Harford, 2000;
Jagannathan et al., 2000; Bonaimé et al., 2013). As a consequence,E.E. Che Johari, D.K. Chronopoulos, B. Scholtens 
dentification strategy (Abadie, 2005). We  complement the inves-
igation of the parallel trends assumption reported in Section 3
Table 3) by conducting a placebo test, where we  falsely assume
hat the increase in deposit insurance coverage was  introduced
n 2006Q4 rather than in 2008Q4. We  use a period spanning
ixteen-quarters surrounding the false change to deposit insurance
overage. If our main results indeed reflect the causal effect of the
rue increase in insured deposits, then ˇ1 should not be significant
n the placebo test.
Column 1 of Table 6 presents the results of this test. The
oefficient on the interaction term (Affected x Placebo Post Event)
s statistically insignificant. This implies that the parallel trend
ssumption holds for our analysis, and also indicates no anticipa-
ion effects of the increase in the amount of insured deposits in
ur sample. The results above provide confidence that our research
esign does not violate the parallel trends assumption. Our analysis
lso includes a number of time-varying control variables as a way
o ameliorate such risk. Such inclusion, however, introduces the
isk of biasing the estimated treatment effect (Atanasov and Black,
016). To provide additional evidence on the robustness of our anal-
sis we replicate our main results without the time-varying control
ariables. The results, tabulated in column 2 of Table 6, show that
he magnitude of the coefficient of interest remains unchanged and
ur main conclusions still hold.
.7. Serial correlation
Serially correlated errors in a difference-in-differences estima-
ion can result in a downward bias in any estimated standard errors
Bertrand et al., 2004). To alleviate concerns regarding serial cor-
elation, we collapse our sample into two time periods. That is,
e average the data for the period before and after the increase
n deposit insurance coverage. The results, which are reported in
olumn 3 of Table 6 confirm our main findings.
.8. Alternative measure of dividend payout
We  also investigate the sensitivity of our findings to alternative
easures of bank dividends. A number of alternative measures of
ividend payouts including the dollar amount of dividends (Chetty
nd Saez, 2005), dividend per share and dividend yield (Cziraki
t al., 2019) are used in the extant literature. Given erroneous data
or the number of outstanding shares reported by a number of banks
s well as lack of market information for unlisted banks in our sam-
le, we employ the dollar amount of dividends as an alternative
ependent variable for Eq. (1). Specifically, we  define Dividends as
he natural logarithm of one plus the dollar amount of dividends
aid by a bank in a quarter. Column 4 of Table 6 shows that the
nteraction term Affected x Post Event remains significantly and neg-
tively associated with this alternative measure of bank dividends.
his further illustrates the robustness of our main findings.
.9. Sample selection issues
We  also investigate whether our results are driven by a bias
n sample selection. Our classification of banks into treated and
ontrol groups is based on the ratio of insured deposits to assets
ollowing the increase in deposit insurance coverage. This is due
o the difference in the value of deposits greater than $100,000
cross institutions just before the change in the deposit insurance
overage came into effect. However, if this difference across banks
s non-random and correlated with dividend policy then this could
ead to sample selection bias and an erroneous causal interpretation
f our conjecture. This could be the case if the treated group of banks
educed dividends more than counterparts in the control group
uring recessions, but not in normal times. We  address this issue byJournal of Financial Stability 48 (2020) 100745 9
employing a propensity score matching technique that allows the
treated and control banks to have similar scores based on a num-
ber of observed characteristics in the pre-treatment period. These
characteristics comprise capital, asset quality, earnings, liquidity,
and size.
Following Berger and Roman (2015), we construct matched
samples of banks using three different matching methods. First, we
conduct a one-to-one matching, which matches each treated bank
to the nearest-neighboring bank in the control group. This match-
ing is performed with replacement such that one control bank could
act as the closest match for multiple treated banks. This match-
ing results in a sample of 320 banks (212 treated and 108 control
banks). We  also conduct a nearest neighboring matching with n =
2 with replacement, which matches each treated bank with two
banks from the control group. Finally, we also perform a nearest-
neighbor matching with n = 3 with replacement. Table 7 presents
the difference-in-differences estimates using the aforementioned
matched samples. The results are qualitatively similar to those
obtained from the unmatched sample, and thus lend support to
the signaling hypothesis.
6. Share repurchases
Dividends are not the only means that banks have at their dis-
posal to channel profits to shareholders. Share repurchases are
an increasingly important payout method for banks. Indeed, share
repurchases have seen a sharp increase over the past twenty years
(Hirtle, 2004; Floyd et al., 2015). However, it remains unclear
whether dividends and share repurchases act as substitutes or com-
plements in distributing cash to shareholders and this could matter
for whether deposit insurance impacts on banks’ share repurchase
activity.
Theory suggests two  main reasons as to why share repurchases
may  act as substitutes for dividends. First, agency (Jensen, 1986)
and signaling (Miller and Rock, 1985) theories posit similar roles
for both dividends and share repurchases.15 That is, theory does
not treat dividends and repurchases distinctly, but rather as sim-
ilar mechanisms. Second, share repurchases can be seen as more
tax effective than dividends if dividends are taxed more heavily
than any capital gains realized by shareholders arising from the
repurchase of shares. Therefore, banks may  prefer to switch from
dividends to share repurchases, and as such treat the two  pay-
out channels as substitutes. If this is the case, and applying the
same reasoning used for dividends above, an increase in the deposit
insurance coverage would allow banks that use share repurchases
as a signaling device to reduce them without creating panic among
their depositors. However, an increase in the deposit insurance cov-
erage could exacerbate moral hazard issues between shareholders
and debtholders thus resulting in banks engaging in risk-shifting
activities via share repurchase activity.
Nonetheless, it is equally likely that the dividend policy of
banks is independent of share repurchases. For example, banks
may  undertake one-off share repurchases in order to reduce agency
conflicts between managers and shareholders (Jensen, 1986) or to
signal that they are undervalued to external investors by offer-
ing a premium above the market price (Vermaelen, 1984). In this
case share repurchases complement dividends as a mechanism
for the payout of short-term cash flows. This line of argument is15 Jensen (1986) and Easterbrook (1984) argue that shareholders may use div-
idends and share repurchases to extract excess free cash flow from managerial
control to minimize unnecessary spending made by managers.
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Table 6
Robustness Checks.
Placebo event 2006Q4 Covariates exclusion Two-period sample Alternative measure of dividend payout
(1)  (2) (3) (4)
Affected x Placebo Post Event 0.0001
(0.0014)
Affected x Post Event −0.0063*** −0.0024** −0.645***
(0.0021) (0.0012) (0.251)
Bank  level controls Yes No Yes Yes
Bank  fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter fixed effects Yes Yes No Yes
Observations 5861 6323 841 6298
No.  of banks 425 425 425 425
Note: This table presents the results of a number of robustness tests on the effect of deposit insurance on bank dividends as well as on the validity of the “parallel trend”
assumption. In column 1, we create a hypothetical event 2 years prior to the actual event in 2008Q4. The results are estimated using a sample spanning the period before
the  actual increase in the deposit insurance coverage. In column 2, we  exclude covariates from the main model. In column 3, following Bertrand et al. (2004), we  collapse
our  dataset into a two-period panel by averaging the observations before and after the change in the deposit insurance coverage, respectively. In column 4, the dependent
variable  is replaced with the (log of) the dollar amount of dividends plus one. All models are estimated using Honoré’s (1992) fixed-effect Tobit estimator to control for
unobserved time-invariant characteristics among banks in our sample. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***,**, and * indicate significance at the 1 %, 5 %, and 10
%  level, respectively.
Table 7
Further Robustness Checks - Matched Samples.
N=1 N=2 N=3
(1)  (2) (3)
Affected x Post Event −0.0089*** −0.0072*** −0.0072***
(0.0026) (0.0022) (0.0022)
Bank  level controls Yes Yes Yes
Bank  fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4744 5438 5721
No.  of banks 320 364 382
Note: This table reports the results of Tobit (censored) regressions using matched sample
on  their fundamentals (size, profitability, capital, liquidity, and risk) and using the neares
Table  8
Deposit Insurance and Bank Share Repurchases.












Bank fixed effects Yes
Quarter fixed effects Yes
Observations 6298
No. of banks 425
Note: This table reports the results of Tobit (censored) regressions using a sample of
425 US BHCs in 2007Q1-2010Q4. The dependent variable is the share repurchases
to  equity ratio. The variable of interest is Affected x Post Event, which indicates the
difference of share repurchase changes between affected and unaffected banks fol-
lowing the increase in deposit insurance coverage. Quarter fixed effects are also
included. The model is estimated using Honoré’s (1992) fixed-effect Tobit estimator,











their dividends by $11.6 million following the deposit insurancen  our sample. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate
ignificance at the 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % level, respectively.
e would expect a change in the deposit insurance coverage to have
o impact on banks’ share repurchase activity. Thus the deposit
nsurance effect on share repurchases may  depend on whether
anks view share repurchases as a substitute or a complement to
ividends, which is, therefore, ultimately an empirical question.
To test this, we estimate Eq. (1) with share repurchases to total
quity as the dependent variable (RPE). Following Hirtle (2016)
e define share repurchases as the sum of treasury stock pur-
hases and net conversions and retirement of common stock. Ins based on different matching methods. We match treated and control banks based
t neighbor matching method with N=1,2 or 3 and with replacement.
this regression, we include the same set of bank control variables
and fixed effects as in the baseline model. The results are reported in
Table 8. The negative and insignificant coefficient for the difference-
in-differences interaction term, ˇ1, indicates that following the
increase in deposit insurance coverage there is little change in share
repurchase activity for affected banks. This is in line with the view
that share repurchases are pro-cyclical and more flexible than divi-
dends, while dividends are sticky, and can be interpreted as a signal
(Guay and Harford, 2000; Jagannathan et al., 2000; Bonaimé et al.,
2013). Therefore, the findings that affected banks reduce dividends
once the deposit insurance coverage increases, but do not adjust
their repurchases, further supports the view that dividends are used
by banks to signal financial health to depositors.
7. Conclusions
In this study, we  investigate the impact on the dividend pay-
outs of US banks following a change in deposit insurance coverage
(from $100,000 to $250,000). The increase in insurance coverage
did not affect all banks equally. Some banks experienced a sub-
stantial increase in insured deposits, while others experienced a
moderate or no increase at all. Using this differential change in
insured deposits across banks to overcome identification concerns,
we investigate whether there is a causal link from deposit insurance
to bank dividends.
Using a difference-in-differences approach, we  show that fol-
lowing the increase in deposit insurance coverage, affected banks
pay lower dividends than unaffected counterparts. This reduction
is also economically significant and not driven by heterogene-
ity across bank charter values. On average, affected banks lowerincrease. This suggests that banks with a large reduction in unin-
sured deposits pay lower dividends due to a reduced need to signal
financial health to depositors. We  also find that capital structure
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oderates the impact of deposit insurance on bank dividends. For
anks with greater reliance on deposits as a funding source, an
ncrease in the deposit insurance coverage is associated with a
arger reduction in dividends. An exhaustive series of additional
ests suggest that our findings are not attributable to other possi-
le considerations such as: capital injections due to participation in
he Trouble Asset Relief Program; peer effects; changes in state tax-
tion; changes in the pricing of deposit insurance; and other local
ime varying events.
Overall, our findings are consistent with our priors that increases
n deposit insurance coverage reduce the need for banks to use div-
dends in order to convey positive information regarding financial
ealth to depositors. As such, our findings contribute to a growing
vidence base, which suggests that deposits play an important role
n determining dividend payout policy, and that banks pay divi-
ends to signal financial strength to depositors. Our findings also
ast doubt on the view that following increases in deposit insur-
nce coverage, banks use dividends as a tool to shift risk from
hareholders to depositors (and taxpayers in general).
Our findings have implications for public policy. Prior evidence
uggests that deposit insurance can lead banks to take excessive
isk or engage in shifting risk to taxpayers. We  show that an
ncrease in deposit insurance coverage reduces the need for banks
o continue paying dividends during turbulent periods when the
ccumulation of retained earnings to bolster capital is likely to be
rucial for financial stability. This finding is important given the
eliance that many banks place on large uninsured depositors who
re more likely to withdraw funds in response to negative informa-
ion. Hence, an increase in the maximum level of deposit insurance
overage appears to lessen the need for banks to signal financial
ealth via dividend payouts.
Given the permanent nature of the increase in deposit insurance
overage used in the current setting, our results do not explain how
ank dividend payouts respond to a reduction in the maximum
evel of coverage. Consequently, future research could usefully
ddress whether bank dividend payouts respond differently to:
ecreases in deposit insurance coverage; and changes in deposit
nsurance coverage during non-crisis periods when there is poten-
ially less need for banks to signal financial strength (via dividend
ayments) to outside stakeholders.
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